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ABSTRACT:The purpose of this study is to examine, using individual
bank data, the relationship between banking structure and short-run
changes inthe allocation of hank credit during the period from
mid-I 965 through the end of 1967. The three rnalor structural (actors
considered are: (1) branching characteristics, (2) bank size, and (3)
urban-rural location. ¶ The effects of sharp changes in monetary
policy during the 1965-67 period tended to be concentrated on
particular groups of banks and on particular types of borrowers. First,
branching characteristics in a given region apparently influenced the
banks' relative ability to attract funds. In the first half of 1966, unit
banks, especially the larger ones, found that deposits which were
sublect to effective interest rate ceilings (savings deposits and demand
deposits) were particularly vulnerable ie the cffcctof disiritcro-cda-
lion. Without branch offices, the unit banks seemed unable to offer is
effective nonprice competition as the other types of banks. Also, the
large unit banks held unusually large correspondent balances, which
were withdrawn. ¶ In the second half of 1 J66, the banks in extensive
branching areas lost large anlounts of time deposits when the interest
rate ceiling prevented them from replacing maturing certificates of
deposit (CD's). Other banks, having fewer CD's outstanding, vere not
as severely affected. the bank in moderate branching areas showed
relatively strong deposit growth throughout the period. Because this
group of banks is less homogeneous, the regions served by moderate
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by shitting a disproportionateshare 01 tcirids into business loans,while loans to the househok]sector were restrictedSince the areas with
extensive branch bankingare also served prirmiarily bya small number of very large banks, theseareas were greatly affected Iw thealloca- tional effects of changesin monetary policy. Because thelarge, exten- sive branching banks areconcentrated in the Far \'Vest and Northeast,
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reallocated a substantialportion of their lending fromconsumer loans and residentialmortgages into commercial andindustrial loans. The areas served bs rural banksor by small urban bankswere relatively i nsulatefrom the allocatronalimpact of short-run policyactions.
Ill INTRODUCTIONAND SUMMARY
At present, relativelylittleis known about therelationships between banking Structure,monetary policy, and theshort-ru,i changes in the allocation of bank credit,It has long beenrecognized that the structural characteristics ofa commercial bankseemingly plaa major role in determining the behaviorpatterns of the bank. Thereare a tiumber of observable cliflerencesrelated to differencesin bank size,geographic location, and branchingcharacteristics Forexample, loan-asset ratiostend to be substantjallhigher in the lalgeurban banks instates with extensive branch banking(see Appendix Table2). Moreover,previous studies have
I
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shown that both size and branching characteristics have a significant
impact on the cost of bank operations.' There is also some indication that
banking structure affects the pricing of bank services, although the evi-
dence in this regard isless conclusive.2
Inall,itseems clear that banking structureis a significant factor
influencing the decision process in an individual bank, affecting, in turn,
the allocation of credit throughout the banking system. However, this
observation, as supported by the evidence cited above, is primarily appli-
cable to the long-run or steady-state situation. Yet, under the financial
conditions prevailing in recent years, the short-run effectsmay be of
overriding importance. When the Federal Reserve is pursuingan active
monetary policyand particularlyifthispolicy resultsina'credit
crunch"it is the immediate availability of credit that really matters. This
is the case, because, in the long run, the nonbank elements of the financial
system can adjust to compensate for major inibalances in the allocation of
bank credit, whereas, in the short run, these counterbalancing adjustments
may not be practicable.
The purpose of the present study is to examine the relationship between
banking structure and short-run changes in the allocation of bank credit.
Unlike studies based on more aggregate data, the findings here are derived
from observations on individual banking units. By using individual bank
data, it is possible to examine the response to changes in monetary policy
as regards the allocation of funds among types of banks, classes of
borrowers, and regions of the country. Because of the interactions among
the structural factors involved, the separate effects could not he distin-
guished without using the microdata employed here. The three major
structural factors considered are:(1) branching characteristics, (2) bank
size, and (3) urban-rural location. The data used cover the period from
mid-1965 through the end of 1967. The financial conditions prcvaWng
during this period offer an opportunity to study the allocational impact of
changes in monetary policy which is, perhaps, unique. In particular, during
the first half of the year, the 'credit crunch" of 1966 illustrates the effects
of competitive bidding for time deposits under a sharp tightening in
monetary policy. During the second half of 1 966, the data show the effects
of a continued tight monetary policy accompanied by effective interest rate
ceilings on time deposits.
To establish a reference point from which to examine short-run changes,
this article first discusses some of the factors leading to differences in
long-run portfolio composition. It then describes how the different types of
banks deviate from their steady-state balance in response to short-run
changes in monetary policy. Monetary policy is viewed as affecting the
allocation of bank credit through three channels: (1) it affects the supply of
funds and the banks' ability to attract deposits; (2)it causes banks toS
change the allocation of available funds between loans and investnlents;
and (3) it causes banks to reallocate loanablc funds among diffeerit types
of loans.
The results of the study show that the effects of sharp changes in
monetary policy during the 1 965-67 period were not transmitted evenly
throughout the system but tended to be concentrated on particulargroups
of banks and on particular types of borrowers. First, branching characteris-
tics in a given region apparently influenced the banks' relative abilityto
attract funds. In the first half of 1 966, unit Lanks, especially the larger ones,
found that deposits which were subject to effective interest rateceilings
(savings deposits and demand deposits) were particularly vulnerable to the
effects of disintermediation. Without branch offices, the unit banksseemed
unable to offer nonprice competitionas effective as that of the other types
of banks. Also, the large unit banks held unusually largecorrespondent
balances, which were withdrawn.
In the second half of 1966, the banks in extensive-branchingareas lost
large amounts of time deposits when theinterest rate ceiling prevented
them from replacing maturing certificates of deposit(CD's). Other banks,
having fewer CD's outstanding,were not as severely affected. The bank in
moderate-branching areas showed, perhaps by default,relatively strong
deposit growth throughout the period.Because this group of banks is less
homogeneous, the regions served bymoderate-branching systems were not
subject to the concentrated impacts ofparticular monetary policy iilstru-
ments.
During the period encompassed by thestudy, there was also a major
reallocation of funds as the result of the highpriority given to commercial
and industrial loans by thevery large banks in urban areas. As monetary
conditions tightened in 1966, these banksshifted funds from Government
and municipal securities intobusiness loans. Loans to financial institutions
and to brokers and dealerswere reduced. More significant for public
policy was the fact that lendingto the household sector was also curtailed
to accommodate business loan demand.Consumer loans and residential
mortgages were given much smaller allocationsof loanable funds and, in
some cases, were actually reduced. Inreallocating their available funds,
the groups of large banks allbehaved in very similar fashion.Differences in
branching structure didnot seem to influence significantly theobserved
response patterns.
Rural banks, and toa lesser extent the small banks in allareas, were
largely insulated from theshort-run impact of the sharpchanges in
monetary policy. Except for seasonalfluctuations, their depositsgrew fairly
steadily and there wereno major reallocations among differenttypes of assets.
In summary then, much of theimpact of changes inmonetary policy was
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concentrated, at least in the short run, on the large, urban banks. The two
extreme fornis of branching structure (unit banking and extensive branch-
ing) proved particularly vulnerable to deposit fluctuations caused by
specific policy instruments, such asinterest rate ceilings. During the
1965-67period, the large banks responded to tight money by shifting a
disproportionate share of funds into business loans, while loans to the
household sector were restricted. Since the areas with extensive-branch
banking are also served primarily by a small number of very large banks,
these areas were greatly affected by the allocational effects of changes in
monetary policy. Because the large, extensive-branching banks are con-
centrated in the Far West and Northeast, urban households in those regions
found that bank credit was extremely restricted from1965through1967.
Banks in those regions reallocated a substantial portion of their lending
from consumer loans and residential mortgages into commercial and
industrial loans. The areas served by rural banks or by small urban banks
were, of course, affected by long-run monetary growth but were, at least
during this period, relatively insulated from the allocational impact of
short-run policy actions.
J
121 THE DATA BASE
The data used in this study are derived from the call reports of each of the
13,300 commercial banks in the country. The reports were turned in to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) semiannually (lune and
December) and cover the period1965-67.Each report contains informa-
tion on about 125 balance sheet items for the bank in question.
To examine the structural factorsoutlined above, the banks are
cross-classified on the basis of size, branching characteristics, and urban or
rural location. Appendix Table 3 gives the data on the number of banks
and total assets in each group of banks. As shown there, the classification
scheme uses nine size classes and three branching groups. The smallest
size class contains those banks with deposits of less than $5 million and
the largest size class consists of banks with deposits in excess of $500
million. An urban bank is defined as one located in a standard metropoli-
tan statistical area (SMSA). All other banks are termed rural banks. As
defined here, the term rural is somewhat of a misnomer, since few banks in
this class are located in truly rural areas. They are instead located in the
smaller cities and towns outside the SMSA's.
Branching characteristics are defined on the basis of observed differ-
ences in state branching structure,not solely on differences in state
branching laws. Using this approach, New York, for exaniple, is classified
as an extensive-branching state despite the fact thatit does not permitI
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statewide branching. AlthoughNew York restricts branchirig privileges, its niajor markets are so dense thatit still has over five aridone-half timesas many branch offices as banks.On the other hand,a state like Utah, with rather limited marketshas less than two branchesper bank, even though it
permits statewide branching.Utah is therefore classifiedas a moderate branching state. Theoverall criterion used is thata state with an average of more than four branchesper bank is classifiedas an extensive-branching
state; a state with fewer thanone-tenth as many branchesas banks is a unit banking state; and allother states are classifiedas having moderate
branching. The distinctionbetween branching bankingand unit banking may be blurred in somestates as a result of theoperation of bank holding
companies The available datacannot be used to examine thisfactor separately but it shouldhe kept in mind ininterpreting the results in the unit banking states. Thestates in each groupare listed in Appendix Table 4. In applying the branchingclassification to an individualbank, the bank is grouped accordingto the characteristics of thestate as a whole. The rationale for this is that thebank's behavior will beinfluenced by the general marketstructure within which itoperates. It would be expected,for example, that a unit bankin an extensive-branchingstate would behave differently froma comparable bank ina unit banking state.
As can be seen inFigure 1, the branchinggroups tend to be concen- trated in specificgeograpjc regions. Thestates with extensive branching
are located on either the EastCoast or (lie West Coast.In terms of deposits, the group is, ofcourse, dominated by New Yorkand California. The unit banking statesare located predoniinantlyin the midwesternportion of the country. The only majorunit banking state outsidethat region is Florida. The other importantunit banking statesare Illinois, Texas, Minnesota,and Kansas. Because of thegeographic clustering of branchingstructures, any (actors which affectthe distribution of fundsamong branching types also affect the distributionamong regions of thecountry.
The data in Table1 and Appendix Table3 clearly illustrate thehigh degree of interactionamong the structuralcharacteristicsPerhaps (he outstanding feature is theextent to whichextensive-branching statesare dominated by a smallnumber of very largebanks. In theextensive- branching states in1965, the average banksize was $123 millionin deposits, and the thirty-fivelargest banks (thosewith depositsover $500 million) heldover three-fourths of all bankdeposits. Theaverage bank size is much smallerunder both unit bankingand moderate branching.In unit banking states, nearlyhalf of all depositsare held by banks with lessthan $50 million in deposits;the average banksize is only $12 millionin deposits. Themoderate-branching states havehalf of their fundsin banks with less than $100million in deposits;average bank size is $18 million in deposits.ri Un bkq
(A1. .nd Meal we .1.00 thU,aapI
Motr.-taatm.g ,,J,M
FIGURE 1Geographic Disiribution of Branching Groups
Rural banks play a much larger role in thosestates with restrictions on
branching. Rural banks hold over 25per cent of the deposits in states with
unit banking or moderate branching, whereas, in theextensive-branching
states, less than 6 per cent of depositsare in rural banks. Needless to say,
the rural banks in all statesare relatively small banks. The average deposit
level is only $6 million and nearly half of all ruralbank assets are held in
banks with deposits of less than $10 million.In contrast, the average
deposit level among urban banks isover $60 million, and over half of all
urban bank assets are held in banks with depositsin excess of $500
million.
[3] BANK BEHAVIOR PATTERNS;
THE STATIC CASE
Before examining the banks' adjustmentsri response to changes in mone-
tary policy, itis useful to outline some of the factors which influencea
bank's long-run portfolio balance. It is particularlyhelpful to trace how the
different types of banking structure might be expectedto lead to differences
in the composition of a bank's portfolio. Initially,it will be assumed that
each structural characteristiccan be analyzed as an independent factor.
Thus, the probable impact of each factor will beexamined, at first, under
the condition that all other factorsare held constant. This is undoubtedly
an oversimplification; and in the last part of the analysis,some of the
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Branching vs. Unit Banks
A bank with branches seenis to have two major operational advantages
relative to a unit bank. First, the branch bank can pool funds from different
areas; and second, it can provide certain types of services to its customers
that unit banks cannot. By pooling funds from several citiesor regions, the
bank may be able to reduce the net variation in deposits and in loan
demand. However, this factor will be important only to the extent that the
regions included in the branching system have significantly different
economic characteristics.If the regions exhibit similar cyclical and sea-
sonal changes in economic activity, pooling will do little to reduce deposit
and loan fluctuations.
On the other hand, the branch hank's ability to provide superior
customer service is invariably a major factor affecting its behavior pattern.
A key service provided by a branch bank, in contrast to a unit bank, is
locational convenience. Previous studies have shown that branch banking
provides customers with substantiafly more bank offices than does unit
barrking. The advantage of branch banking is particularly marked in the
larger metropolitan areas, where the convenience of branch banking
should assist a bank in attracting savings deposits and in granting consumer
loans and residential mortgages. Thus, other things being equal, as com-
pared with a unit bank, a branching bank would be expected to obtain a
greater proportion of its funds from savings deposits and would invest more
of its assets in consumer loans and residential mortgages.
Large vs. Small Banks
Since there is no evidence of significant technological diseconomies of
scale in banking, it is apparent that large banks possess several advantages
relative to small banks. First, small banks are largely excluded from a major
segment of the commercial loan market, Both regulatory constraints and
prudent management put limits on the amount which a bank can lend to a
single borrower. The credit needs of a large, national corporation may
easily exceed the lending limit of a small, or even moderate-sized, com-
mercial bank. As a result of their wider lending opportunities. the larger
banks can be expected to put a greater proportion of their funds into
commercial loans.
The larger banks possess a similar advantage in obtaining funds through
the use of large denomination negotiable certificates of deposit (CD's).
Since the development in the early 1960s of a secondary market for CD's,
these deposits have become an important source of funds for large com-
mercial banks. Because such deposits are highly sensitive to changes in
interest rates, banks are able, through moderate increases in rates, to attract
additional CD's to meet an increase in loan demand. Since the bulk of the
CD's are in large denominations, small banks operate at a serious disad-I
S
vantage iii this market. [yen iioderate-si zed banksIi ave to payan interest premium relative to the rates paid by Fh('money-market banks, Iieau5e
CD's issued by smaller, lesser-knownbanks arelesssalableinthe secondary market.
Finally, alarge bank has a greater tibi lilyto borrow tunds andto influence the supply of certaintypes of deposits in ordertooffset
fluctuations in other types of deposits. Theunits of trading on the federal
funds and Eurodollar marketsare so large as to inhibit participationby
smaller banks. The CD market, clueto its high interest elasticity,can be
used to compensate for fluctuations in othertypes of deposits. As has been
discussed above, here too the larger banksOSSCSS an advantage relative to
the smaller ones. These factors make it possible forlarge banks tooperate
with fewer secondary reserves than small banks.
Urban vs. Rural Banks
The most obvious difference between thetwo groups is that a rural bank
would be expected to do muchmore agricultural lending than wouldan
urban bank. Conversely, the urban bank wouldprobably have somewhat
greater opportunity for comtiiercial and industrial lending.Since its cus-
tomers tend to be dispersed over a relatively widearea, the rural bank is
also likely to be lessconsumer oriented than the urban bank. The rural
bank cannot offer thesame degree of customer conveniences, and the
market it can reach is more restricted. Hence, therural banks would attract
fewer savings deposits and would make fewerconsumer loans and residen-
tial mortgages.
It is also possible that the behavior pattern ofa rural hank will differ from
that of an urban bank becat'se of inherent differencesin the basic prefer-
ences of either the bank's management or the bank's customers. Itis, for
example, often suggested that rural banksare more "conservative" than
urban banks. This presumably would imply thata rural bank would have
greater secondary reserves, a lower loan-deposit ratio,a higher capital-
asset ratio, and so on. On the other hand, the deposits of the rural bank
may be more stable due to the relative inaccessibility of alternativeuses of
the depositors' funds. By reducing thevariance in deposits, this factor
would permit the rural bank to hold fewer secondaryreserves, i.e., to
behave less "conservatively." In all, though itis quite conceivable that
there will be behavioral differences between urban arid ruaI banks, itis
not possible through a priori reasoning to determine the net effect of the
differing preferences. This isa matter which cn only be explored empiri-
cally.
Interactions among Structural Factors
There are several instances in which the factors discussed above do not act
independently but, instead, interact significantly with each other. Perhaps
214
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branching restrictions and banksize. In this case, the connection between
the two factors is the result ofa direct causal relationship. One of the
principal motives for a bank to establishbranches is to promote the growth
of the bank. In those states wherebranching is permitted, the banking
system tends to be dominated bya small number of very large banks. Thus,
in comparing a unit bankingsystem with an extensive-branching system,
one is likely to be comparing a system composedof numerous small banks
with a system concentrated ina few large ones.
To the extent that an extensive-branchingsystem is dominated by a few
large banks, these banksmay possess a certain degree of monopolypower,
which will influence the performanceof the system. However, it is notat
all clear whether extensive branchingproduces an increase or a decrease
in bank concentration and marketpower; it depends on what is considered
the relevant market for bankservices.In a national or local market,
branching may reduceconcentration; whereas in a state or metropolitan
market, branching can increaseconcentration.5 Furthermore, the evidence
currently available indicates that changesin concentration ratios over the
observed range havevery minor effects on bank performance.6 The possi-
ble impact of differences in marketpower is not considered as a separate
factor in the present study.
It was pointed out above thaia unit bank isrestricted in providing
banking services to the householdsector. It would seem that this factor
would assume much greater importancefor a large unit bank than fora
small one. Thus, one wouldexpect to find the differences between unit
and branch banks particularly notablein the larger size classes. On the
other hand, a small bank ina branching region will not necessarily behave
in the same way asa small bank under unit banking. Even though, in the
former case, the small bank is likelyto be a unit bank, itis subject to
competition from the branches of the larger banksin the system. lhis is
especially true of a small bank inan urban branch-banking area. A small
bank under unit banking is much lessexposed to competition from larger
banks. Even in thevery small size classes, this factor maycause some
differences in behavior patterns betweenbanks in unit- and branch-
banking regions.
141 BANK PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION IN1965
If the structural factors discussed above do,in fact, exert a significant
influence on bank behavior, this should he subjectto empirical observa-
tion as differences in the composition of bankportfolios. By looking at
these differences at a given point in time,one can obtain a rough
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The information presented in this seuion will be used subsequently ds d
reference point in analyzing the relationship between bank structure arid
the short-run allocation of bank credit.
Sources of Funds
In examining the various sources of funds, the most marked differences are
in the banks' ability, or willingness, to acquire savings deposits. Unit banks
obtain a relatively low proportion of their funds from savings deposits;
large banks have fewer savings deposits than small banks; and, in most
cases, rural banks have fewer than urban banks (see Appendix Table 1for
illustrative data).' It is interesting to note that within each size class, urban
unit banks hold substantially fewer savings deposits than urban extensive-
branching banks, but in the aggregate, the urban unit banks hold a greater
proportion of savings deposits. Thisisan instance in which,in the
aggregate data, the effects of differences in size have more than offset the
impact of differences in branching structure.
In most instances, the patterns for demand deposits are merely the mirror
images of the results for time and savings deposits. Generally, demand
deposits provide a larger proportion of funds for unit banks, large banks,
and rural banks. However, if one is interested in thesources of loanable
funds, the fact that the proportion ofgross demand deposits increases with
the size of the bank is somewhat misleading. When demand depositsare
adjusted by subtracting reserves and cash items in theprocess of collec-
tion, the proportion for these adjusted demand deposits doesnot increase
with the size of the bank.
In addition to the above-mentioned differencesin the types of deposits,
the various groups of banks showsome significant differences in the types
of depositors. First, there are the deposits held by othercommercial banks.
These correspondent balancesare generated by the smaller banks making
deposits at the larger urban banks with whichthey have dealings. Such
deposits provide the small banks with liquidity,and at the same time,
compensate the larger banks for the services they provide. Theoutstanding
feature of the correspondent balancesis their importance for tile large
banks in unit banking states. These banksobtain some 12 per cent of their
total funds from correspondent balances,as contrasted with only 6 per cent
for comparable banks in otherstates. The banks in unit banking statesseem
to have compensated for the lack of branchesby having developed a much
more extensive system of correspondent relationships.
The proportion of funds suppliedby the deposits of state and local
governments also varies widely among thegroups of banks. Under all three
branching structures, the smallerbanks receive a larger proportion oftheir
funds from state and local depositsthan do the larger banks, It isinteresting
216 David T. Kresgethat in comparable size classes, the rural banks do as wellas, or slightly
better than, the urban banks.
The remaining source of bank funds is capital, which includes capital
issues, surplus, undivided profits, and capital reserves. The capital ratios
are very similar for all groups of banksexcept that the smallest banks
(deposits less than $5 million) hold appreciably more capital than other
banks. To the extent that a high capital ratioisindicative of more
conservative behavior, this finding would support the contention that the
managers of small banks tend to be more cautious than their counterparts
in the larger banks. However, the capitai figures do not support the
contention that rural banks are more conservative than urban banks.If
anything, the rural banks have lower capital ratios.
Secondary Reserves and Bank lending
As shown in Appendix Table 2, large banks hold far fewer Government
securities than do the small banks. Under all three branching structures,
the proportion of assets held in Government securities is less than half as
large for the large banks (over $500 million) as it is for the small banks
(under $5 million). There isalso some tendency forthe banks in
extensive-branching states to hold fewer Government securities than the
banks in other states. The impact of braning structure is, however, much
less pronounced than is the effect of differences in size. The evidence does
not support the contention that rural banks consistently invest a relatively
large portion of their funds in secondary reserves. Itis true that in the
aggregate, rural banks hold a larger proportion of Government securities
than do urban banks, but this mainly reflects the difference in the average
size of the urban and rural banks.
It can be argued that municipal and agency securities are also liquid
assets and should be included, at least in part, in secondary reserves. Since
these securities are held more extensively by the larger banks, their
inclusion would reduce the impact of the size factor. Nonetheless, the
qualitative results would remain the same, even with the definition of
secondary reserves expanded to include municipal and agency securities.
For example, in unit banking states, secondary reserves would still decline
from 32 per cent of assets for the smallest banks to 23 per cent for the
largest banks.
The ratio of secondary reserves held by a bank is often used as an
indicator of how aggressively, or cautiously, that bank utilizes the funds
available toit.Another, perhaps more direct, measure of the bank's
utilization of funds is the proportion put into loans. This criterion reveals
higher utilization for the larger banks, though in the extensive-branching
states the increase is very slight.Inall size classes, the banks in the
extensive-branching states have a higher proportion of funds in loans than
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the banks in other states. The rural banks have lower loan-asset ratios in
the smallest banks, but this difference does not carry over into the other
size classes.
In general, the data indicate that a greater proportion of funds are loaned
out by large banks and by banks in states with extensive-branching
systems. Particularly conservative lending policies are pursued by the
smallest rural banks. In addition to these broad differences in total bank
lending, the various groups of banks display substantial differences in the
composition of lending. The next sections will examine the differences in
the allocation of funds to three major categories: commercial and indus-
trial loans, residential mortgages, and consumer loans.
Commercial and Industrial loans
There are two outstanding features in the data on commercial and indus-
trial loans. First, funds devoted to these business loans increase sharply
with the size of the bank. The large urban banks devote 20 to 30per cent
of their total assets to this single category of loans. The small banks do far
less business lending, and the small rural banks have only 5 to 10per cent
of their assets in such loans.
The second major point concerns the impact of branching structure
Among the small and medium-sized banks, the unit banks typically do
somewhat niore business lending than the moderate-branching banks and
less than the extensive-branching systems. However, iii the largest size
classes, the unit banks concentrate very heavily on commercial loans.
Since much of the lending by this group involves national firms,itis
unlikely that the difference in behavior patterns can be attributed to
differences in the local demand for loans. The phenomenon is more
reasonably explained by differences in alternative lending opportunities
available to banks of various types. The unit banks simply do not have
ready access to the markets for other loans, such as residential mortgages
and consumer loans.
Residential Mortgages
The market for residential mortgages is to a large extent localized. The unit
bank, operating from a single geographic location, labors under a severe
handicap. The result, as shown in Appendix Table 2, is that unit banks are
able to grantrelatively few residential mortgages. This effectpersists
through all size classes and shows up in the rural banks as well as in the
urban ones. In the largest size class, the unit banks place only 2 per cent of
their funds in residential mortgages, as compared with 8 per cent for the
l)anks with less restricted branching.
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Consumer loans illustrate the interaction between the size factor and the
impact of branching restrictions. Since even in the absence of branching
restrictions, small banks serve a limited geographic area, the restrictions
have a relatively minor impact. On the other hand, for the larger unit
banks, the inability to have local loan offices isa serious constraint. The
detailed data show that for the size classes above $30 million in deposits,
the unit banks consistently grant fewerconsumer loans than the branching
banks. Itis interesting to note that in the larger size classes,itis the
moderate-branching states, not the extensive-branching ones, that have the
highest proportion of consumer loans.
[5J MONETARY POLICY AND THE ALLOCATION OF
BANK CREDIT IN 1965-67
The portfolio characteristics described in the previous section providea
reference point fromhich to judge the impact of short-run changes in
monetary policy. The issue here is whether bank responses to short-run
changes differ appreciably from the expected long-run adjustments. A
closely related question is whether theresponse patterns differ among the
different types ot banks. Differences inresponse patterns would have
important policy implications, since they would produce reallocations of
bank credit among different classes of borrowers andamong different
regions of the country.
If the banking system were experiencing steady growth under stable
monetary conditions, one would expect to find the major portfolio com-
ponents growing at approximately equal rates. A constant monetary policy
would be represented by reasonably steady growth in the monetary base at
a rate proportional to the growth in the general economy. A short-run
change in monetary policy would then appear asa significant deviation
from this steady growth path in the reserve base. Whenmonetary policy
alters the rate of growth in the reserve base, this necessarily producesa
corresponding change in the growth of aggregate bank credit. A neutral
bank response can be defined operationallyas one in which all portfolio
components are adjusted proportionally. That is,all portfolio items grow
(or decline) at the same rate as the rate of change in total bank credit. For
an individual bank or group of banks, a neutral response is one in which
total credit for the group changes at the same rateas aggregate bank credit,
and all portfolio components for the group move proportionally. Note that
a neutral response does not imply that all types of banks react in the same
fashion. In fact, under a neutral response, the static differencesamong the
Monetary Policy arid the Allocation of Bank Credit 219various types of banks would persist indefinitely. As used here, a neutral
response is simply a fixed reference point.Itis a hase from which to
measure changes in the allocation of bank credit.
The extent to which the actual bank response patterns differ from the
neutral pattern can be measured by comparing the differentials in the
growth rates for the various types of bank lending. Employing the same
reasoning, the impact of monetary policy upon the bank's sources of funds
can be observed by comparing the growth rates in the different types of
deposits. However, in this section no attention will be given to the bank's
deposits. The primary concern will be to outline the observed changes in
monetary policy and to demonstrate that these changes did, in fact, have
substantial, nonneutral effects upon bank lending decisions, and thus upon
the allocation of bank credit during the 1965-67 period. The following
section will examine the factors which caused this reallocation.
Monetary Policy during 1965-67
In 1965, the economy was in the fifth year of continuous expansion and
was operating at nearly its full productive potential. The unemployment
rate was approaching the full-employment target of 4 per cent. During the
expansion, prices had remained remarkably stable, and the Federal Re
serve had been able to expand credit sufficiently to accommodate the
increase in economic activity. But then, in late 1965, the Vietnam escala-
tion produced severe inflationary pressure, and, in the absence of any
major fiscalrestraint, monetary policy was tightened substantially.In
December 1965, the Federal Reserve signaled this change by raising the
discount rate from 4 per cent to 4½ per cent. Of equal importance, the
maximum allowable interest rate on time deposits was raised from 4½ per
cent to 5½ per cent. This meant that during the first half of 1966, banks
were able to use CD's and similar instruments to compete effectively for
loanable funds. Certain types of banks, especially those experiencing
strong loan demands, were able to bid funds away from other banks and
from other types of financial intermediaries.
During the second half of 1966, inflationary pressures continued to
mount and monetary policy became extremely tight.In addition to a
severely restrictive open-market policy, the Federal Reserve imposed limits
on the interest rates which banks would pay on the various types of time
deposits. The permissible rates were actually lowered on the small-
denomination and short-term time deposits. Ceiling rates on other time
deposits, and in particular on C D's, were maintained at 5½ per cent. In the
face of the general rise in market interest rates, CD's rapidly lost their
competitive position. Banks which in the first part of the year had used
CD's to expand their lending now found that they were losing funds due















Following the "credit crunch" of 1966, monetary policy was sharply
eased in early1 967. As the reserve base expanded and interest rates
geiieray dediired, lidnks were a'ule to rebuild a soiuewliat more normal
portfolio position. However, under an expansionary fiscal policy, inflation
continued to accelerate, and by midyear interest rates had again begun to
rise. The second hail of 1967 was the beginning of another period of
increasingly restrictive monetary policy.
Total Bank Lending
For present purposes, the data from 1966 are particularly interesting,
because of the sharp contrast between the two halves of the year. Loan
demand was very strong throughout, but during the first half, banks were
able to compete aggressively for loanable funds, whereas during the
second half, the interest rate ceilings precluded effective competition.
These changes in financial conditions were accompanied by some pro-
nounced changes in the pattern of bank lending. In those states with unit
banking, the amount of credit extended during the first half of 1966 lagged
substantially behind the expansion in the banking system as a whole.
Aggregate bank lending increased at an annual rate of nearly 111/2 per
cent, while in unit banking areas the increase was just over 8 per cent (see
Table 2). In terms of dollar amounts, if unit banks had increased lending at
the national average rate, loans at those banks would have increased by
$2.5 billion in the first half of 1966. The actual increase was only $1.8
billion. By this estimate, there was a reallocation of bank credit of $700
million during that six-month period. Whatever the causes of this realloca-
tion, the impact seems to have been quite widespread among the unit
banks. Of the twelve states with unit banking, nine showed an increase in
lending which was below the national average. Every size class of unit
bank, except the very smallest (deposits less than $5 million), expanded
lending at a below-average pace. Unit banks in both urban and rural
locations made relatively few loans, although the pace at the urban banks
was particularly slow, falling nearly tour percentage points below the
national average.
In the second half of 1966, the situation was markedly different. With
the use of interest rate ceilings to restrict competition, the major impact of
monetary policy seemed to be shifted to the urban banks in extensive-
branching states. Bank lending in these states increased at an annual rate of
less than 3 per cent (see Table 2). The banking system as a whole was
lending at more than twice that pace. This represented a reallocation of
more than $1.2 billion in bank credit away from the extensive-branc!ing
areas.
Despite the sharp change in monetary policy, bank lending in the first
half of 1967 followed almost the same pattern that it had assumed in the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8second half of 1966. In the aggregate, bank loans increased at a rate just
under 6 per cent, while loans in extensive-branching areas increased less
than halt as much, In fact, in urban extensive-branching areas, bank loans
increased only 2.2 per cent. Although in the aggregate, monetary policy
was much less restrictive at this time, the effects of the previous 'credit
crunch" seem to have carried over into 1967.
The other significant change in the allocation of bank creditis the
consistently strong growth in bank loans within the moderate-branching
areas. From the end of 1965 to mid-1967, moderate-branching banks
expanded loans by 1 5 per cent, while the other types of banks increased
loans by only 10 per cent. During this period, over 20 per cent, or nearly
$2¼ billion, of the new lending by moderate-branching banks was at-
tributable to the shift of funds from other areas.
Composition of Bank tending
In addition to affecting the distribution of total bank credit, changes in
monetary policy altered the way in which credit was allocated among
different types of borrowers. {)uririg the 1966 "credit crunch," banks
generally shifted their lending from the household sector to the business
sector. Consumer loans,8 in particular, seem to have been very hard hit in
this period. After increasing at an annual rate of nearly 10 per cent in the
first half of 1966, consumer loans increased at less than 1 Y2 per cent in the
second half of the year (see Appendix Table 5). Among the urban banks, in
areas with either moderate or extensive branching, there was actually a net
decline in consumer loans (see Appendix Table 6). This is noteworthy,
because consumer lending is usually regarded as an activity in which
short-run adjustments are infeasible, owing to the high start-up costs. It is
also worth observing that the moderate-branching banks made the sharpest
cutback in consumer loans, even though these banks made the least drastic
adjustments in the pace of total lending.
Bank lending in the form of residential mortgages was also significantly
affected by monetary policy during this period. In this case, however,
much of the impact seems to have been confined to the extensive-
branching banks. Residential mortgages at these banks increased at a rate
of less than 2 per cent during the last half of 1966 and then declined by
more than that amount in the next six months. Thus, from mid-1966 to
mid-i 967, on balance, the extensive-branching banks withdrew funds from
the residential mortgage market.In contrast, the banks in other areas
supplied $1.7 billion to this market. That is an increase of 8Y2 per cent,
which closely matches the expansion in total lending by these other banks.
Throughout the period being studied, the funds that were shifted out of
the household sector were being used primarily to sustain bank lending to
business. Despite an extremely restrictive monetary policy, which included
Monetary Policy and the Allocation of Bank Credit 223some 'jawboning" by the Federal Reserve todissuade barks from making
so many business loans, bankscontinued to expand comrne1Ci'and
industrial loans at nearly 10 per cent a yearthroughout 1966 and 1%7
(see Table 3). Even during the "credit crunch"in the second half of 1 966,
these loans increased at a rate of more than 9 per cent.Within this general
pattern, there were, however, a numberof significant differences among
the various types of banks. As would beexpected, the emphasis on
commercial loans was more pronounced amongurban banks. Except for
seasonal variation, the rural banks tended toexpand their business loans at
approximately the same rate as their total lending. Amongthe urban banks,
the extensive-branching banks made the mostradical reallocation of funds.
From mid-1966 to mid-i 967, when thesebanks were under great pressure
as a consequence of monetarypolicy, commercial loans increased by $3.4
billion, while all other loans were reduced by$1.5 billion. Although the
other types of urban banks also expandedcommercial loans more rapidly
than other loans, the reallocation of funds was notnearly as pronounced as
that undertaken by the extensive-branchingbanks.
[6] FACTORS CAUSING THE REALLOCATIONOF
BANK CREDIT
In the preceding section, it has been shown that the changes in monetary
policy during the 1965-67 period did, in fact, produce significantchanges
in the allocation of bank credit. The purposeof this section is to examine
the mechanisms by which that reallocation was brought about,and to
determine how certain classes of borrowers were able to obtain a dispro-
portionate share of bank credit during a period of restrictive monetary
policy. The three major elements to be considered are: (1) redistributionof
bank deposits; (2) changes in the allocation of funds between loans and
investments; and (3) reallocation of loanable funds among different types
of loans.Itis apparent that any of these factors, acting singly or in
combination, could produce the observed changes in the pattern of bank
lending.
Redistribution of Deposits
As has been pointed out in the earlier discussion of the static situation,
there are some substantial differences in the mix of sources from which the
different types of banks obtain their funds. Because of this,itis quite
conceivable that changes in general nionetary conditions can alter the
distribution of funds among the various types of banks. In addition, the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































226 David I. Kresge
parameters such as interest rates, service charges, advertising, and so on.
Unfortunately, using the present data,itis impossible to distinguish the
exogenous changes in bank deposits from the induced changes. All that
can he observed is the net effect of the various factors.
As shown in Figure 2, there were several major shifts in the pattern of
deposit flows during the 1965-67 period. That figure shows how deposits
in each branching group grew relative to the growth in the banking system
as a whole. Since the aggregate deposit growth is largely controlled by
Federal Reserve policy, what isrelevant here is the relative,not the
absolute, growth. The nieasure of deposits used is total deposits minus
"cash," where cash consists of cash items in the process of collection,
deposits with other banks, and reserves. The rationale for subtracting cash
is to compensate for certain transient items and for funds which are not
available for lending purposes. The resulting variable, adjusted total
deposits,is an approximate rreasure of total loanable funds from deposit
sources.
Three striking points are illustrated by the data in Figure 2: (1) the large
relative decline in adjusted deposits at unit banks in the first half of i 966;
(2) the extremely sharp drop in deposits at extensive-branching banks in
the second half of 1966; and3) the sustained above-average growth in
deposits at moderate-branching banks throughout the entire period. The
pattern revealed in Figure 2 can be examined more fully by means of
Figures 3A through 3C. These figures show the movements in each of the
three types of deposits: demand deposits,° savings deposits, and time
deposits. Since the evidence does not indicate any significant reallocation
of funds among the different types of rural bankc, the figures refer to urban
banks only. The rural banks will be discussed separately later.
In looking at the first half of 1 966, perhaps the most surprising thing is
that nothing really remarkable seemed to be happening to deposits at
urban unit banks, but despite this, these banks were gaining deposits at less
than half the pace of the rest of the banking system. Their demand deposits
showed a seasonal decline, with moderate growth in time deposits and a
small decline in savings deposits. The weakness in this situation can be
revealed only by comparing it to the pattern of the other banks. Early 1966
was a period when banks were bidding aggressively for time deposits, both
from corporations and from households. Urban unit banks were unable, or
unwilling, to keep pace with the other banks, and their time deposits were
growing nearly one-third less rapidly. This discrepancy was due almost
entirely to the very large unit banks. These were increasing time deposits at
only half the rate of the rest of the banking system, whereas the smaller
unit banks were very nearly keeping pace with the other banks.
The competition for time deposits and the rising open-market interest














FIGURE 2Deviations from Average Growth Rate in Ad-
justed Total Deposits
bank was, in effect, exposed to two drainson its savings deposits. There
was an external drain as individuals moved funds from savings deposits
into other financial institutioits and into open-marketinstruments. There
was also an internal drain as the bank's own depositors shifted funds from
savings deposits to the higher-paying time deposits. This lattermovement
can be seen quite clearly in the detailed data. Other things being equal, the
banks which made relatively large gains in time depositsalso tended to
suffer relatively large losses in savings deposits. However,this generaliza-
tion does not seem to apply to the large urban unit banks. Althoughthese
banks had quite modest growth in time deposits, they sufferedvery large
losses in savings deposits. Figure 4C shows thatup to a bank size of about
$30 to $50 million in deposits (size class 5), therewas little difference in
the movements of savings deposits under the different branchingstructures.
Amorg the larger banks, the unit banks experienced relatively largelosses
in savings deposits, while their IPC time depositst2grew much more
slowly. For example, among the largest urban banks (depositsover $500
million), IPC time deposits grew by 18per cent in unit banks compared to
34 per cent in the other banks, while savings deposits declined by 71/2per
cent at the unit banks compared with 61/2 per cent in the other banks. Thus,
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FIGURE 4Changes in Urban Bank Depositsby Size
ClassFirst Half of 1966
under tight monetary conditions and withaggressive competition for funds,
savings deposits appeared to be a relatively vulnerablesource of funds for
large unit banks.
Unit banks also suffered unusually large withdrawalsof demand deposits
during this period. Due to seasonal factors,some decline in demand
deposits is expected in the first half of theyear, but as shown in Figure 4B,
the large unit banks had much larger withdrawalsthan did the other
classes of banks. A major portion of this losswas due to tile unusually large
withdrawals of correspondent balances heldat the large unit banks.
A possible explanation of the general shift in depositsis that the large
unit banks were particularly susceptible to the impact ofdisintermediation.-10
FIGURE 4(Continued)


















it Should be recaiied that disintermediationwas of increasing concern
during 1 966 as the rising marketinterest rates attracted more andmore
funds out of commercial banks,savings and loan associations, and other
financial intermediaries. Commercialbanks attempted to counter this by
advertising their advantagesas "full service banks." The bankswere, in
effect, using nonpricecompetition to compensate for the fact thatregula-
tory constraints prevented them fromusing price (interest rate) competition
for certain classes of deposits.The two major types of depositssubject to
effective restraintswere demand deposits (on which interestpayments
were prohibited) and savings deposits(on which the Regulation Q ceiling
rate was far below marketrates). Unit banks may have lost theseIwo types
of deposits because theywere simply unable to offer effectivenonprice
competition. In particular, the largeunit banks could not offer the loca-















































posits. Also, the large unit banks do relatively little consumerlending and




232 David T. Kresge
were in a comparatively weak position tooffer "full-service banking' as
compensation for lower interest rates. Theirstructural characteristics, com-
bined with the regulatory constraints,left the large unit banks at a
competitive disadvantage which may accountfor their losses in savings
and demand deposits. These losses, along with therelatively slow growth
in time deposits, account for the below-averagegrowth in bank deposits in
the unit banking states, and especially in the urban areas,during the first
half of 1 966.
Monetary policy was tightened still further in thesecond half of 1 966,
and a change in Regulation Q produced a sharp reallocation of bank
funds. Deposits at both unit banks and moderate-branching banks ex-
panded by about 3Y2 per cent, while deposits at extensive-branching banks
fell by 0.6 per cent.Itis apparent from Figure 3B that time deposits
account for most of the shift in funds. Regulation Q interest rate ceilings
were below market rates, and commercialbanks were unable to compete
effectively for time and savings accounts. The extensive-branching banks,
which had relied heavily on both consumer and corporate time deposits,
saw the gain in time deposits drop sharplyfrom $4.5 billion in the first half
of 1966 to $0.4 billion in the second half of the year. Total time and
savings deposits at these banks actually fell by $200 million in the second
half, while time and savings deposits at other banks increased by $4.0
billion. These figures represent a decline of 0.4 per cent in extensive-
branching areas and increases of 3.2 per cent for unit banking and 4.8 per
cent for moderate-branching areas.
Clearly, the Federal Reserve was using open-market operations and
Regulation Q to restrict the aggregate growth in time and savings deposits
and in total bank credit. Moreover, in pursuing its aggregate policy goals,
the Federal Reserve caused a major structural reallocation of bank funds.
From the data available here, it is not clear just what caused the policy
impact to be concentrated so intensively on extensive-branching banks. it
may be hypothesized, however, that in expanding their time deposits so
aggressively, the extensive-branching banks had attracted a great deal of
"hot money," which was very sensitive to interest rate differentials. When,
due to Regulation Q, bank rates fell below market rates, this money was
withdrawn asthe outstanding certificatesof depositmatured. The
extensive-branching banks may also have had a relatively large proportion
of consumer savings certificates, which were lost due to the rollback in the
applicable interest rate ceiling.'Whatever the reason, itis apparent that
time deposits at extensive-branching banks were particularly vulnerable to
the use of interest rate ceilings as instruments of monetary policy.
Deposits held at urban banks in moderate-branchingareas seemed to be
reasonably responsive to changes in aggregatemonetary policy, but they
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instruments employed. As shown in Figures2and 3C, deposits at
moderate-branching banks showed relatively stable growth during the
period of very active monetary policy. The aggressive competition for
deposits during the first half of 1966 and the interest rate ceilings in the
second half of the year did not have a disproportionate impact upon these
banks, as they did upon the unit banks and the extensive-branching banks.
As a result, the growth in total deposits at moderate-branching banks held
up quite well throughout 1966. From December 1965 to December 1966,
deposits at urban moderate-branching banks increased by 6 per cent,
compared with 4 per cent for unit banks and 2 per cent for extensive-
branching banks. Time deposits at moderate-branching banks grew very
rapidly during the first half of the year when competition was not con-
strained by interest rate ceilings. These time deposits continued to grow
even in the second half when the rate ceilings were in effect. Savings
deposits showed only a small net increase in 1966, but the impact of
disintermediation did not produce the large withdrawals experienced by
the other classes of banks.
The relatively stable flow of funds to the urban moderate-branching
banks can probably be attributed in large part to the diversity among the
banks comprising this group. There are no structural or legal factors
operating to produce homogeneity, nor are there any factors causing
dominance by a small subset of similar banks. The typical market in a
moderate-branching state would be served by a variety of banks, with
different numbers of branches, different structural characteristics, and
different response patterns. In contrast, a unit banking area is, of necessity,
served only by banks without branches. An extensive-branching area
could, in principle, be served by banks of various types, but in practice
most markets are dominated by a small number of large banks.14 Thus,
under unit banking, there is a similarity among banks imposed by legal
restraints; and under extensive branching, there is similarity due to domi-
nant firms. What 1966 demonstrated was that when a restrictive monetary
policy is implemented using instruments such as Regulation Q, the impact
on the availability of funds can vary widely among different types of banks.
If a given market is served primarily by a single type of bank, and if that
bank is particularly vulnerable to the instrument being used, than that
market will be subject to a disproportionate impact of monetary policy.
Apparently, this is what happened to the unit banking areas in the first half
of 1966, and to the extensive-branching areas in the second half of 1966.
On the other hand, the moderate-branching areas were subjected to much
less concentrated doses of monetary policy. If one type of bank within
these areas was particularly hard hit by a certain policy instrument, another
bank would be likely to fare relatively well. On the whole, the urban banks
in moderate-branching states came through the 1966 'credit crunch"billion dollars
3
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FIGURE 5Changes in Deposits at aural Banks by Types of
Deposits
adjusted demand
much more smoothly than did the banks in otherareas. This is not to say
that monetary policy hadno effect, but the repercussions were not as
concentrated or erratic as under the other branchingstructures.
For all three branching structures, the ruralbanks seem to have been
effectively insulated from the effects of short-runchanges in monetary
policy. Even the extreme stresses of1 966 produced only very modest
changes in the flow of funds to rural banks(see Figure 5). The rate of
acquisition of savings deposits slowed down, butunlike the urban banks,
the rural ones never actually lost savings deposits.The rural banks did not
show an upsurge in time deposits in the7irst half of 1966, but neither did
they show a sharp decline in the growthof time deposits in the second half
of the year. The movements in demanddeposits were largely attributable
to seasonal factors, though the restrictivemonetary policy in the second
half of 1966 may have dampenedthe normal seasonal gain.
The pattern of changes in total depositsis very similar for the three types
of rural banks (see Figure 6). In eachcase, the pattern is dominated by
seasonal factors. The unit banks exhibitwider seasonal fluctuations, but on
an annual basis, there is little differenceamong the three groups. The rural
unit banks do a relatively largeamount of agricultural business,' and this
may account for their greater seasonality. On thewhole, the flow of funds
to rural banks proved remarkably stable, andchanges in monetary policy
did not cause reallocations ofdeposits among the different branching
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Changes in Asset Allocation
The growth in total earning assets for any class of banksis largely
controlled by the flows of funds into those banks. The relative growth rates
in earning assets will, therefore, closely parallel the relativegrowth rates in
bank deposits. Thus, in terms of total earning assets, the redistributive
impact of monetary policy will be the same as thatdiscussed in the
previous section. However, changes in monetary policy may, inaddition,
cause banks to redistribute the available fundsfrom one type of asset to
another. In particular. one might expect a very tight monetarypolicy
to cause banks to reduce their secondary reserves (investments)in order to
provide funds for additional lending. The data in Appendix Table 6show
that during the 1965-66 period, the urban banks did, infact, tend to
increase their loans relative to other assets.
Between June 1 965 and December 1967, loans at urbanbanks increased
from 67.5 per cent of assets to 70.0 per cent of assets. This increaseof 2½
percentage points represents a shift of more than $6billion from invest-
ments into loans. Over the same period, the total increasein loans was $25
billion, so the reallocation among assets providedenough funds to
account for one-fourth of the increase in urban banklending. In late 1965,
the reallocation of funds was accomplished without any netreduction inDavid T. Kresge
any major asset category. The urban banks did notsell their investment
securities; they simply increased them less rapidlyri order to increase
loans more rapidly. Then,. in the first half of 1966. there was substantial net
selling of U.S. Government securities. Some reduction in Government
securities due to seasonal factors would be normal, but the decline of 11.4
per cent is far more than seasonal. The funds derived from thesale of
Government securities were used both to increase lending and to purchase
municipal and agency securities. In fact, holdings of rnunici pals increased
substantially more rapidly than lending (see Appendix Table 6).This
strategy was reversed abruptly in the second half of 1966 as monetary
policy was further tightened and Regulation Q became effective. The urban
banks were forced to sell some of their municipal and agency securities to
sustain their lending and to rebuild their holdings of Government se-
curities.
Examination of the more detailed data shows that these sales were
confined solely to the largest urban banks. The banks with deposits in
excess of $500 million sold $1.3 billion in municipal and agency securities
in the second half of 1966, whereas the other urban banks were actually
making net purchases of $600 million. In Appendix Table 8, it can he seen
that in 1966 the large banks made substantial reallocations of funds to
support their lending activity. By the end of 1966, their holdings of
marketable securities had been drawn down to very low levels. As a result,
when monetary policy eased in1 967, a large portion of the new money
was used to rebuild the investment portfolio. By shifting funds from
investments to loans in 1966, and from loans to investments in 1967, the
large banks were able to spread out the impact of the 1 966 tight monetary
policy.
It is apparent from Appendix Table 7 that the rural banks were able to
sustain a steady growth throughout the entire 1 965-67 period. The alloca-
tion of funds between loans and investments seems to have been deter-
mined primarily by seasonal factors. The holdings of U.S. Government
securities were built up in the second half of the year and then drawn
down in the first half of the succeeding one. In their investment portfolios,
the rural banks did substitute municipal and agency securities for Govern-
ment securities, but there is no evidence of any cyclical response in the
form of a significant reallocation of funds between loans and investments.
OveraU, the rural banks present a picture of impressive stability. This
confirms the impression conveyed above in the discussion of deposit
behavior.
None of the data presented in this section have been disaggregated on
the basis of branching structure, because that factor does not seem to have
an identifiable independent impact on asset allocation. Loans and in-
vestments do grow at different rates under the different branching struc-I
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tures, but the patterns can be more properly attributedto differences in
deposit growth or to differences inaverage bank size.In general, the
discussion concerning the allocation offunds between loans and invest-
ments is equally applicable to all of the branchingcategories.
Changes in the Composition of Lending
In addition to the factors discussed above,some of which are outside the
bank's control, the distribution of bankcredit is influenced by the indi-
vidual bank's decision concerningthe allocation of loanable funds. Under
tight monetary conditions,a bank may choose to restrict certain types of
lending in order to increase the supplyof funds to more favored borrowers.
It has already been observed that duringthe period studied, banks did, in
fact, expand their commercial and industrialloans much more rapidly than
other lending. Consumer loans and residentialmortgages are two impor-
tant areas in which the banks adopted relatively restrictivelending policies.
The purpose of this section is toexamine the relationship between the
observed changes in the pattern of lendingand the structural characteris-
tics of the banking system. In order to accomplishthis, the growth in each
loan category will be comparedto the growth in total lending for the
various groups of banks. By concentratingon relative growth rates, this
procedure tends to screen out the effectsof other factors, such as differ-
ences in the availability of funds and changes in loan-depositratios.
Bank size is clearly the most significantstructural determinant of the
observed pattern of bank lending. Across allthree branching groups, the
banks with deposits inexcess of $500 mllion show a very different
response as compared with the smaller banks (see figure7). The large
banks devoted a markedly disproportionateshare of their loanable funds to
commercial and industrial loans. In fact, from mid-1965to mid-1967, the
increase in commercial and industrial loans($13 billion) was only slightiy
less than the increase in total lending($14 billion). The expansion in
business lending by large bankswas financed in part through a relative
slowdown in lending to the householdsector. Between 1965 and 1967,
commercial and industrial loans increased 34per cent whereas residential
mortgages increased 11 per cent, andconsumer loans gained only 4 per
cent. At the large banks, approximately half of the totalincrease in
comniercial lending was financed by shifting funds fromother types of
lending. Over $2 billion was shiftedout of the loans supplied to the
household sector; that is, residentialmortgages and consumer loans in-
creased $2 billion less than they would have if they hadgrown at the same
rate as total lending.
In addition, the large banks shiftedvery large sums of money out of their
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tinancial sector were reduced by $1 billion inthe second half of 1 966 and
by another $2 billion in the firsthalf of 1967. The financialloans
apparently served as secondary reserves forthe hank. They were assets
acquired during times of relatively abundantfunds, and they were sold, or
not renewed, as monetary policy wastightened. In terms of their function,
the financial loans are more nearlycomparable to marketable securities
than to the other loan categories.Financial loans provided the largebanks
with an important source of additionalfunds for commercial andindustrial
loans. Nonetheless, the shift of lunds outof residential mortgagesand
consumer loans, althoughsmaller in size, was probably of greater concernMonetary Policy and the Allocation of Bank Credit 239
as regards public policy, since the househoki sector didnot have ready
acrcc to other sources of credit.
Among the banks with deposits of less ihan$500 million, there islittle
evidence of any systematic shift of funds fromone category of loans to
another. As shown in Figure 7B, therewere seasonal movements in the
major loan categories, but over the periodas a whole, all categories of
loans grew at approximately thesame pace. Despite the drastic changes in
monetary policy and in financial conditions, these banks madealmost no
reallocation of loanable funds. This behaviorpattern is in striking contrast
to that of the larger banks, as illustrated in Figure 7A. The smallgroup of
very large banks responded in a fashion totally different from other banks
in the system. The relatively rapid growth in commercial andindustrial
loans observed in the aggregate datawas due solely to the actions of the
large banks. Most of the contraction in lendingto the household sector was
also attributable to the larger banks.
The size classification used here is, ofcourse, arbitrary; the group of
large banks could perhaps have been definedas those with deposits in
excess of $700 million or even $1 billion.6 This might have sharpened the
results, but the major conclusion would still have been thatthe largest
banks, unlike the other banks, responded by reallocatingtheir loanable
es funds. Because of the relationshipsamong bank size, location, and branch-
ing structure, this finding has further iniplications for the generalallocation
of bank credit. For example, all of the large banksare urban banks. Thus, it
is the size factor which was responsible for the cutback in the bankcredit
provided to urban areas for consumer loans and residentialmortgages. The
restriction on bank loans to households in states with extensive branching
was also attributable to the size factor rather than to the branchingper se.17
Since the banking system in these stateswas dominated by the very large
banks, their decisions hada much greater impact than the actions of large
banks in the states with other branchingstructures. Finally, the localities
most affected by the reallocation of bank creditwere the urban areas in
states with extensive branching. Thus, urban households in the Far West
and in the Northeast found the supply of bank creditextremely restricted
and relative to conditions prevailing in otherparts of the country. It should be
oans emphasized that the evidence does not indicate thatan individual bank of
ssets a specified size allocated funds differently in the Far West or Northeast
d, or than elsewhere. Instead, the impactwas due to the fact that these areas had
mion, an unusually large share of their total bank credit provided by banks in the
rities largest size class.
anks The available data cannot provide a definitive answer to the question of
strial what caused the large banks to act as they did. Since the different types of
and large banks reallocated funds in very similar ways,itislikely that they
cern were responding to a common factor. It is possible that the characteristic
jwhich set the large banks apart from the other banks in the systemwas the
fact that they operated extensively in the national money markets,ilarger
proportion of their loans going to national firms than to the regional and
local firms served by the smaller banks. It is notuncommon for a national
firm to have lines of credit at several banks, which, in total, substantially
exceed its normal borrowing. However, under the extremely tight credit
situation of 1965--67, the typical firmislikely to have increasedits
utilization of its lines of credit. Asa consequence, the large banks, as a
group, were most probably exposed to a substantial increase in the
effective demand for commercial and industrial loans. The result of this
circumstance would be an increase in their commercial loans relative to
other types of loans and relative to thepace of lending at other types of
banks. Although the hypothesis cannot beproven, it is consistent with both
the institutional characteristics and the observed behaviorpatterns.
171 CONCLUSIONS
The data presented here show that the changes inmonetary policy
observed during the 1965-67 period produced significantvariations in the
allocation of bank credit. The short-runresponse patterns of many banks
were quite different from the patterns observed in their static portfolio
balance. In addition, banks with different structuralcharacteristics (size,
location, and branching characteristics) respondeddifferentlyto the
changes in monetary policy. The followingare some of the key factors
underlying the reallocation of bank credit:
Demand and savings deposits at large unit bankswere particularly
vulnerable to the process of disintermediation observedduring the
first half of 1966.
Large, extensive-branching bankswere hard hit by the use of interest
rate ceilings on time deposits.
The supply of funds to rural banks seemedalmost totally unaffected by
the changes in monetary policy.
The supply of funds to moderate-branchingareas was affected by
changes in aggregate monetary policy, butthe impact was more
balanced than that observed under theother branching structures.
Under all three branching structures, thelarge urban banks (deposits
over $500 million)soldinvestmentsecuritiesduring the1966
'credit crunch" to financean expansion in loans. The smaller urban
banks made a much less drasticreallocation of available funds and,
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ingeneral, continued to add bothsecurities and loans to their
portfolios.
f.The large urban banks devoted thevast hulk of their loanable funds
to commercial and industrial loans. Theysharply restricted funds
supplied to the consumer loan andresidential niortgage markets.
The factors just enumerated leadto certain types of reallocations of bank
credit which have particular significancefor the design and evaluation of
monetary policy. First,it appears that much of the impact ofa restrictive
monetary policy is concentratedon the large banks in urban areas. Rural
banks, and the customers theyserve, are insulated from the effects of
short-run changes in monetarypolicy. Areas served by the two extreme
forms of branching structures(unit irikng and extensive branching) find
that the supply of bank credit isquite sensitive to the mix of monetary tools
employed. Areas served by the lesshomogeneous moderate-branching
systems experience much moreeven responses in the supply of bank
credit.
Because branching structuresare geographically concentrated, changes
in monetary policy can shift funds fromone region of the country to
another. Thus, the Central and Midwesternstates, which are unit banking
areas, had their supply of hank funds curtailed in early1966. Then, in the
second half of 1966, the impact ofa tight monetary policy fell more
heavily on the extensive-branchingstates on the West Coast and in the
Northeast.
Throughout the 1966 "credit crunch,"the total supply of bank credit to
the household sectorwas sharply restricted. Since this was due almost
exclusively to the actions of the largeurbar banks, the households inareas
served by such banks borea disproportionate share of the impact of
monetary policy; urban households, particularlyon the West Coast and in
the Northeast, had their supply of bankcredit cut back sharply. In contrast,
the business sector, whichwas the ostensible target of the restrictive
monetary policy, received virtually all of the loanablefunds available at
the large urban banks. In light of this,it would seem that the allocational
implications should be an important elementin the design of appropriate
monetary policies. This study has shown that thestructural characteristics


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TAB(E A-4States Included in Each Branching Group
States with fewer than 0.1 branches per bank.
5Siates with more than 4.0 branches per bank.
Statwith 0.1 to 4.0 branches per bank.









Nebaska New York Louisiana
Oklahoma North Carolina Maryland
Texas Oregon Massachusetts





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 .See L.'SJX'C a I ly the Beland Murphy Sb dy c't' also lien St' n2 Set' Edwards31, Flrchsig 141J,ic ohs 171iw)Jfri j
See HOFViIZ and Shull 161, and Guttentag andI Ierman I'l, pp. 1t.- 6) It should be emphasized that thus 5e(tionis considering the influence()Size alone The discussion does not consider the effe ts01 market power. it is quiteconc eivablthat j large bank ssull have sonic appreciable degreeof monopolyiXower HOevCr timeisu of monopoly versus competitionIs separahk tron) the effectsof batik SIZc'per s See Guttentag and Herman 151,pp. 30-65, and Ffo,vitz and Shull
161. See Edwards 131, Flechsig 141, and Kaufman181
To keep the tables from becoming too unwieldy,data are given only forthe largest and smallest banks and for a "typical"medium.sized hanL
This category includes automobile loans,repair and nioderni,,ition loansother install- ment loans, and sungle-paynient personal loans
Thus adjustment is nearly thesame as that made by the FederalReserve in Coraputing "net demand deposits," except thatreserves have also leen subtracted
Fiere Demand deposits have again been adjustedby Subtracting cash fromthem In Principle, the reserves required for time andsavings deposits should have- beentreatej separately but since reserves are reportedas a single number, all res(''es
are subtracted from demand deposits.
When the interest ceilingon time deposits had been raisedto 51/2 per cent in December 1965, the ceilingon savings deposits had been keptat 4 per cent. IPC time deposits are those held byindividuals, partnerships,and corporations In December 1965, the interest ceilingon all time deposits had been raisedto 5 1/2 per cent. However, in September 1966, the ceilingwas lowered to S per centon certificate of deposit of less than $100,000.
Recallthat the thirty-five banks withdeposits over $500 millionholdover 75 per cent of the bank assets in theextensive-branching states.
For example, agricultural loanswere 12 1/2 per cent of total assets forrural unit banks Agricultural loans were 3per cent and 6 1/2 per ccitt of totalassets for extensive. branching and moderate-branchingrural banks.
A lower cutoff would not have beenappropriate because the next smallersize class ($250-$500 million) behaved like thesmaller banks, not like the largerones. Over the longer run, itmay be the bank's ability to add brancheswhich produced the large banks in these states, hut,in principle, the two factors shouldbe kept separate.
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